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The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
 
Donald C. Langevoort*
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 One need not spend much time in business settings to observe that 
reason does not always seem to rule.  My own academic curiosity in the 
psychology of organizational behavior started while I was still in practice, 
in a law firm and then in government, recently having studied corporate law 
informed by the law and economics movement of the 1970’s.  This was a 
time when even political progressives had become enamored with 
marketplace solutions to regulatory problems (the wave of deregulation in 
the airline industry, banking, etc.) and the rational actor model of 
competitive behavior had taken a firm grip on policy analysis.   
 Even though I was a junior lawyer, I was fortunate enough to find 
myself in a number of projects where I was able to observe (quietly and 
without any hope of influencing) senior executives of very important 
companies and very high government officials at work.  I also paid close 
attention to the senior lawyers who advised them.  And my impression—
which later turned into a particular research interest1
 Even then, of course, there was a large body of scholarly work in 
social psychology and organizational behavior that questioned the 
—was that ego often 
seemed the more compelling force in judgment and decision-making than 
cold, hard rationality, and that senior subordinates were often enablers of 
egotistical choice.  The lawyers and executives I most admired were those 
clever enough to prompt different, presumably better choices via flattery 
and other influence techniques that left the top person’s inflated self-esteem 
relatively intact.   
                                                 
*   Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University.  My thanks to 
Bob Thompson, Eric Sundstrom and Joan Heminway for very helpful comments and 
discussion. 
1   See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior and Law, 81 Va. L. Rev. 
853 (1995); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of 
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 101 (1997). 
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assumption of pervasive rationality in competitive business settings and 
readily accommodated pervasive egotistical inference and other cognitive 
biases.  Orthodox economics has had its doubters all along.  Over time this 
academic joust has turned into a remarkably fruitful research agenda.2
 What has become clear for both descriptive and normative analysis 
is that incorporating insights from psychology into corporate and securities 
law means having to climb four tall steps to gain plausibility.  The first is 
that what psychologists describe as predictable cognitive traits or biases are 
not observed consistently even in the decision making of a single 
individual.  Most people are capable or acting more or less rationally 
depending on a host of situational, emotional and other contingent 
influences.  As a result, we have to know much about the situation as well 
as the person to make any robust behavioral prediction.
  
While some interdisciplinary tension remains, the collaboration between 
psychology and economics has become constructive and productive, under 
the heading of behavioral economics.  The genre often referred to as “new 
institutional economics” readily incorporates ideas such as bounded 
rationality, information deficiencies, transaction costs, agency costs, moral 
hazard and the like into theories of behavior that depart considerably from 
the Bayesean depiction of rational choice commonly used in formal 
economic models.  In turn, scholarship in corporate and securities law has 
borrowed extensively from this new learning, especially in the last decade 
or so, to try to incorporate limits on rationality into legal analysis of 
corporate behavior.   
3
                                                 
2  In the economics literature, an important symposium published in the Journal of 
Business in 1986 set forth both the differences and common ground between the 
traditionalists and the behavioralists, the latter having been particularly influenced by the 
Nobel Prize-winning work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.  See The Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory, 59 J. Bus. S181 (1986).  For a review of how this debate 
quickly diffused into legal scholarship, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of 
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1499 (1998). 
  The 
3  Indeed, one of the fundamental messages of contemporary social psychology is that the 
situation often matters more than the disposition—notwithstanding the so-called 
fundamental attribution bias, which leads people to think otherwise.  See, e.g., RICHARD 
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF HUMAN 
JUDGMENT (1980).  As to context, one of the important contributions in corporate 
behavioral economics called doubt on whether something as robust as the endowment 
effect has significant power when decisions are made by corporate agents.  See Jennifer 
Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. Legal. 
Studies 1 (2002). 
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psychologically prudent answer to any question of how someone—e.g., a 
CEO in a particular setting, or group deliberation by a board of directors—
will think or act is almost always “it depends,” which does not lend itself to 
particularly bold or confident legal analysis.   
 The second big step to overcome is because the strength and 
intensity of dispositional traits and biases observed in both laboratory and 
field settings vary considerably among the population—some people are 
more likely to display them than others.  In other words, even if we know 
the situational context, we also have to know something about the 
personality and related dispositional makeup of the particular actor.4  And 
here is one of the conventional economists’ major gauntlets for 
behavioralists to negotiate: people who become CEO’s, CFO’s and board 
members are different from the average person, and, by hypothesis, 
substantially more “rational.”  If rationality leads to competitive success, 
then rationality will be favored in the selection and promotion tournaments 
that determine who exercises corporate power.  To me, this is the most 
interesting step in the challenge to behavioral law and economics, about 
which I and others have written much.5
 The third step is institutional.  Even if we decide that some 
behavioral trait, such as overconfidence or emotionally-driven risk-taking, 
is likely to affect executive judgment and decision-making, there is no 
reason to automatically assume that it will affect the firm’s choices.  Almost 
all important corporate decisions follow a process—multiple people 
involved sequentially, and often with group collaboration at various steps 
along the way.  We have to predict that the process will permit the bias to 
survive, as against (presumably) strong competitive incentives to “de-bias” 
individual shortcomings.  Organizational behavior research has identified 
common de-biasing mechanisms frequently used by corporations.
   
6
 This third step can only be addressed empirically—psychology itself 
stops being concretely helpful once we pass beyond small group behavior.  
Organizational scholars trained in sociology push back strongly against 
   
                                                 
4  See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L.J. 67 (2002). 
5 See, e.g., Organized Illusions, supra; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and 
Discrimination from a Corporate Perspective: Grease, Grit and the Personality Types of 
Tournament Survivors, in MITU GULATI & MICHAEL YELNOSKY, EDS., NYU SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION, vol. 3, at 141 (2007). 
6  See, e.g., Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can 
Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 Res. in Org. Behav. 1 (1998). 
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excessive focus on individual cognition, claiming that broad social and 
cultural forces, not psychological ones, are the proper subjects of inquiry for 
thinking about the firm.7
 These are three high steps to climb but still surmountable if taken 
carefully, as we shall see.  But even if we make it that far, we reach the 
normative question—so what?  If some form of non-rational behavior is 
commonplace, there is a prima facie case for intervention.  Deciding what 
that intervention should be, however, can itself be vexing.  The challenge is 
both ideological and practical. Research suggests that, especially among 
those with a conservative ideological orientation, behavioral explanations 
do not qualify as legitimate excuses, and the right remedy for cognitive bias 
is to make the person (or firm) learn painfully from the experience.
  Unfortunately, sociology tends not to generate 
simple, tractable behavioral models except when reduced backwards to 
something like an economic (rational choice) approach, so that testing 
hypotheses rigorously is difficult.  Moreover, the empirical questions—
identifying whether outcomes are rational or non-rational and then trying to 
isolate causal connections in a corporate choice setting of interest to the 
law—can be extraordinarily complicated.   Many instances of “poor” firm-
level choice can plausibly be characterized as either behaviorally 
problematic or the result of simple, rational opportunism by corporate 
insiders, i.e., an agency cost problem.   
8  And 
even for those willing to engage in some kind of paternalistic intervention, 
such interventions are very costly and hard to accomplish successfully.  
Perhaps the most common illustration, which I and others have explored at 
length,9
                                                 
7  For a useful response from researchers sympathetic to the use of psychology, see Barry 
Staw & Robert Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in KEITH MURNIGHAN, ED., 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 350 (1993). 
 is that corporate and securities law’s favorite strategy—more or 
better disclosure—often fails when up against a well-ingrained, 
8   See Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both the 
Disease and the Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?, 45 Admin. Sci. Q. 293 
(2000). 
9   This is especially so when a seller has an interest in taking advantage of the bias.  E.g., 
Sendhil Mullainathan et al., Coarse Thinking and Persuasion, 123 Q.J. Econ. 577 (2008); 
Jon Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail 
Investors and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1043-
48 (2009).  In addition, there is a strong cultural and historical tolerance for advertising and 
marketing techniques that are at heart mildly manipulative, making it difficult to excise 
from business practice. 
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institutionally favored behavioral bias.  There may be places where a legal 
or regulatory “nudge” can work, but many others where it has to be a much 
stronger shove that judges and regulators will feel both ill-trained and 
under-resourced to give and follow through on with respect to the expected 
and unanticipated consequences.   In other words, as we shall see, there 
probably are places where corporate law recognizes the likelihood of 
persistent behavioral biases that threaten shareholders’ best interests, but is 
unable to think of a precise, legitimate, cost-efficient response and so just 
ignores it.  That is not necessarily wrong, even if it may seem lamentable. 
  
II.  BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS ABOUT MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
 Legal scholars have used psychology to analyze many different 
problems—board of director group behavior in corporate law10 and 
marketplace “irrationality” in securities law11 are particularly well-plowed 
fields.  With the notable exception of work by Jim Fanto roughly a decade 
ago,12 however, little attention has been given to integrating behavioral 
findings into M&A law, even though some classic insights came from that 
subject area early on.  Most of the remainder of this essay will illustrate the 
methodological challenges and opportunities described in Part I as it applies 
to corporate M&A law.  We are aided here by a number of recent and 
thorough literature reviews by financial economists on behavioral 
approaches to corporate financial activity.13
                                                 
10  E.g., James D. Cox & Harvey Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological 
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 Law & Contemp. Prob. 83 
(1984); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith and Structural Bias, 32 J. 
Corp. L. 833 (2007). 
  In law, there is a small but 
11  See, e.g., Lynn Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the 
New Finance, 28 J. Corp. L. 635 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits 
of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
135 (2002). 
12  See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in 
Merger Decision-Making, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1333 (2001); James A. Fanto, Braking the 
Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 Buff. L. 
Rev. 249 (2001).   
13   E.g., Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey, in B. ESPEN 
ECKBO, ED., THE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 
(2007). 
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helpful body of scholarship on the related subject of “behavioral antitrust” 
from which to borrow as well.14
 The starting point here is a stark divide that exists in behavioral 
corporate finance.
 
15
 If, however, we relax the assumption of market price efficiency, 
then things change dramatically.  Ever since the high point of market 
efficiency theory in the mid to late 1970’s, contrarians have pointed out a 
number of anomalies in real world market price behavior vis-a-vis the 
predicted world of near-perfect efficiency.
  Classical orthodox law and economics on merger 
activity assumes the rationality of both the managers (and directors) of the 
subjects companies and their shareholders.  Even if the latter is relaxed 
somewhat, the assumption remains that the stock price will be set rationally 
in an efficient market, and that the stock price will be the main reference 
point for shareholder best interests.  As a result, the possibility of irrational 
individual shareholder behavior is unlikely to be of much consequence. 
16
 We need not explore in detail what behavioral finance substitutes for 
market efficiency: there is certainly no agreed upon model of non-rational 
stock price movements (if there were, it would promptly be arbitraged 
away).  Instead, there are often conflicting predictions of overreaction and 
underreaction to news, momentum trading, trading on pseudo-news and the 
like, many of which can be tied to well-known behavioral regularities like 
loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, the representativeness heuristic, limited 
attention, etc.  We can fairly assume that these traits are prompted by large 
numbers of situational factors whose interaction can be extraordinarily 
complex and contingent, making the “irrational” market seem fairly chaotic 
  Among other things, there is 
much too much trading behavior, too much volatility, and too many 
instances of pricing excess (bubbles and crashes) to conform easily to the 
efficiency hypothesis.  To be sure, many classical financial economists still 
believe strongly in efficiency and work hard to justify the observations as 
consistent with risk-adjusted models of efficient pricing, but the assumption 
is today at the very least heavily contested within mainstream finance, if not 
on the decline.   
                                                 
14  See, e.g., Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline 
and Legal Policy, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 482 (2002); Maurice Stucke, Behavioral Economists 
at the Gate: Antitrust in the 21st Century, 38 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 513 (2007). 
15   See Baker et al., supra note --.   
16   See sources cited in note --- supra. 
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and subject to unpredictable mood swings.  Numerous book length 
treatments of this field are available.17
 For purposes of legal analysis, we need only assume that stock 
market prices can diverge from fundamental value for sustained time 
periods (either for individual securities, industries or asset classes generally) 
and/or that market prices do not immediately impound all available public 
information.  We then lose confidence in market price as a discipline, which 
was the primary assumption that motivated the bold predictions of corporate 
law and economics in the 70’s and 80’s in articulating optimal (often 
largely deregulatory) M&A legal policy—the celebrated work of 
Easterbrook and Fischel, etc.   
 
 This takes us to the main fork in the road.  Irrational markets are 
plausible because they involve the participation of large numbers of smaller 
unsophisticated investors (“noise traders”) who, under the right 
conditions—particularly limited arbitrage because of short selling 
restrictions and limitations—can have sustained effects on stock prices.  
The smart money in the form of larger, sophisticated investors is generally, 
though not inevitably, presumed to be more rational but unwilling or unable 
to stem the tide of marketplace emotions.  If we then assume rationality on 
the part of corporate managers, there are opportunities to exploit.  Most 
obviously, there will be prices of individual companies that are depressed 
temporarily vis-à-vis their fundamental value, which makes them vulnerable 
to cherry-picking in the M&A market for less than a “fair” price18 
(conversely, if it is the potential acquirer whose shares are overpriced 
because of irrational exuberance, it is time to do a stock-for-stock deal19
                                                 
17 E.g., GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW PSYCHOLOGY 
DRIVES THE ECONOMY AND WHY IT MATTERS (2010); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED 
AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 
(2003); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE (2000).  The intellectual history of the efficiency-inefficiency debate is recounted 
in accessible fashion in JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET (2009). 
).  
If structural or governance deficiencies exist on the target side that lead too 
readily to a sale, we may have an unnecessary and inappropriate transfer of 
wealth to acquiring firms, with unfortunately collateral consequences to 
employees, suppliers, etc. when the transactions are highly leveraged and 
thus carries excessive risk.   
18  See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” 
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891 (1988). 
19   See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. Fin. 
Econ. 295 (2003). 
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 We see the source here of many of the debates about takeover 
policy.  The less confidence we have in market prices, the less we can trust 
individual shareholders to make rational decisions about whether to tender 
or not into a hostile bid.  Collective action problems abound, and so most 
market critics tend toward accepting the need for a shareholders’ 
“bargaining agent” to make a sophisticated financial analysis of the bidder’s 
offer and act on their behalf.  The poison pill is the mechanism of choice 
here, which moves us quickly to the question of whether a committee of 
independent directors of the target is likely to be a faithful bargaining agent.  
Scholars and practitioners disagree about that.20
 Again, this legal literature is so well developed that we need not dig 
any deeper into it.  It is enough for now to see the connection of the 
behavioral finance literature and the unraveling of the law and economics 
orthodoxy when stock prices become less reliable.  But a second branch of 
behavioral corporate finance relaxes the assumption of managerial 
rationality instead of (or in addition to) assuming market inefficiency, 
positing that managers make predictable cognitive errors either in bidding 
for another company or in responding to a bid, in both negotiated and 
hostile transactions. 
  An alternative might be to 
force greater disclosure from the bidder and/or target upon the 
commencement of a contested transaction and let the shareholders vote—a 
strategy that relies on a number of difficult assumptions about both the 
efficacy of disclosure and the rationality of shareholder voting decisions. 
 This is a particularly interesting subject for our purposes because it 
brings into play all four of the steps that behavioral law and economics has 
to take to claim the desirability of some kind of law reform.  M&A 
transactions are extraordinary financial events and so receive deep and 
sustained attention, not the kind of setting for “quick and dirty” heuristics.  
They are negotiated by the most seasoned business professionals—senior 
executives, aided by teams of lawyers and bankers—not your ordinary 
psychology laboratory subjects.  And they are subject to an extensive multi-
person process of deliberation and approval on both sides.   
 To be sure, there are conflicts of interest and incentive deficiencies 
that may distort decisions.  Putting aside the “merger of equals” transaction, 
companies either acquire or are acquired, which means a premium will have 
to be paid to the target company shareholders (and perhaps pay-offs to their 
                                                 
20   E.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871 (2002). 
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insiders as well).  For some time, it has been well known that there are 
incentives that favor acquisitions quite apart from strategy or profitability—
so-called corporate imperialism is an agency cost problem arising from the 
fact that executive compensation and perquisites are more closely tied to 
size than efficiency.  Hence managers may prefer non-value enhancing 
growth.  And so, the empirical evidence that many acquisitions are “value-
destroying” in hindsight comes as no surprise.21
 There is, however, a growing body of work suggesting that the 
agency cost explanation may not be entirely accurate, offering a behavioral 
account of bidder overpayment instead.  I will not try to summarize all the 
research on this subject, but just offer an overview.  One of the initial 
contributions here was by a distinguished (and otherwise fairly orthodox) 
financial economist, Richard Roll, who put forth his “hubris 
hypothesis”
  But that is not irrationality, 
and requires no keen psychological insight to anticipate. 
22
 We noted earlier that there is no reason to believe that CEO’s are 
psychologically similar to the general population; the standard assumption 
has been that they are more cognitively adept and rational.  But there is a 
significant literature in behavioral economics—both theoretical and 
empirical—that challenges that assumption and says that CEO’s, on 
average, are likely to be both overly confident in their abilities and more 
risk-seeking than a rational choice model would predict.  In their overview 
of behavioral corporate finance, Baker, Ruback and Wurgler offer the basic 
intuition: 
—that there is something akin to a winner’s curse that arises 
out of any auction-like setting because the winner will by definition have 
the most optimistic valuation of the asset in question (and thus presumably 
be an outlier).  His use of hubris, a form of poor judgment, prompted others 
to look more closely at the psychological make-up of the person who 
controls the bidding: the acquirer’s CEO. 
                                                 
21   E.g., Sara Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring 
Firms Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. Fin. 757 (2005); Thomas Lys & Linda 
Vincent, An Analysis of Value Destruction in AT&T’s Acquisition of NCR, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 
353 (1995); Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. 
Econ. Perspectives 103 (2001).  The precise extent of the harm from acquisitions is open to 
question.  See William Bratton, Whither Hostility?, in Greg Gregoriu & Luc Renneboog, 
eds., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY IMPACT ON MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 103 (2007). 
22  Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986); 
see also Bernard Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597 (1989). 
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There are good reasons to focus on these particular biases in a managerial 
setting.  First, they are strong and robust, having been documented in 
many samples, in particular samples of managers.  Second they are often 
fairly easy to integrate into existing models, in that optimism can be 
modeled as an overestimate of a mean and overconfidence as an 
underestimate of variance.  Third, overconfidence leads naturally to more 
risk-taking.  Even if there is no overconfidence on average in the 
population of potential managers, those that are overconfident are more 
likely to perform extremely well (and extremely badly), placing them 
disproportionately in the ranks of upper (and former) management.  And 
fourth, even if managers start out without bias, an attribution bias—the 
tendency to take greater responsibility for success than failure—may lead 
successful managers to become overconfident. . . .23
 
 
This all follows fairly predictably from the tournament theory of 
organizational selection and promotion: as skill levels become more 
concentrated up the ladder, the winner of a contest among managers is the 
one willing to risk the most—and lucky enough not to have it blow up on 
him or her.24
 In a series of articles, Malmendier and Tate take this idea and test it 
empirically against patterns of corporate M&A behavior, using a sample of 
Forbes 500 firms from 1980 to 1994: 
   Overconfidence leads to diminished risk perception. 
 
We find that overconfident CEO’s are more likely to conduct mergers 
than rational CEO’s at any point in time.  The higher acquisitiveness of 
overconfident CEO’s—even on average—suggests that overconfidence is 
an important determinant of merger activity.  Moreover, the effect of 
overconfidence comes primarily from an increased likelihood of 
conducting diversifying acquisitions.  Previous literature suggests that 
diversifying mergers are unlikely to create value in the acquiring firm.  
                                                 
23   See Baker et al., supra. 
24  See Anand Goel & Anjan Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate 
Governance, 63 J. Fin. 2737 (2008); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational 
Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 968 (2002).  There is an extensive experimental literature here, e.g., 
Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental 
Approach, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 306 (1999), as well as many large-scale empirical studies, 
e.g., Mathew Hayward & Donald Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large 
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 Admin. Sci. Q. 103 (1997).  This literature is 
closely related to work suggesting that CEO narcissism has an effect on acquisition 
behavior.  See NIHAT AKTAS ET AL., CEO NARCISSISM AND THE TAKEOVER PROCESS, July 
2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1638972; Arijit 
Chatterjee & Donald Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic CEO’s and their Effects on 
Company Strategy and Performance, 52 Admin. Sci. Q. 351 (2007). 
 11 
Thus it is consistent with our theory that overconfident managers are 
particularly likely to undertake them.  Second, we find that the 
relationship between overconfidence and the likelihood of doing a 
merger is strongest when CEO’s can avoid equity financing, i.e., in the 
least equity dependent firms.  Overconfident CEO’s strongly prefer cash 
or debt financed mergers to stock deals unless their firm appears to be 
overvalued by the market.25
 
   
Of course, these studies have to identify overconfidence: there are different 
kinds of metrics that have popular among behavioral economists who work 
with large data sets, particularly Malmendier and Tate’s choice to use stock 
option non-exercise as a proxy for overconfidence.26  Recently, however, a 
study by Graham, Harvey and Puri sought to dig more deeply and was able 
to administer standard psychology tests to a large sample of CEO’s and 
CFO’s, and then run regressions to identify correlations between personality 
types and basic corporate financial decisions, including M&A.   The results 
confirmed the basic intuition that CEO’s, at least, are substantially more 
optimistic and risk tolerant than in general.  They also find a significant 
relationship (making no claim about the direction of causality, however) 
between these traits and the frequency of M&A activity, which they find 
consistent with the hypotheses in both Roll and Malmendier and Tate.27
 Although the overconfidence-based theory is the dominant approach 
in behavioral corporate finance, there are other provocative findings about 
M&A behavior.  For example, a recent paper by Baker, Pan and Wurgler 
considers the influence of the target’s historic 52 week high (economically 
   
                                                 
25  Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence 
and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. Fin. Econ. 137 (2008).  See also Ulrike Malmendier & 
Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. Fin. 2661 (2005). 
26  For earlier work setting the stage for this preference, see Chip Heath et al., 
Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise, 114 Q.J. Econ. 601 (1999). 
27  JOHN GRAHAM ET AL., MANAGERIAL ATTITUDES AND CORPORATE ACTIONS, Duke-
NBER working paper, July 2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1432641.  An 
obvious question to consider is how this benefits the firm, so that firms are willing to hire 
overconfident CEO’s.  There are many answers in the literature.  The dominant one is that 
an excess of optimism at the top has positive collateral effects that outweigh the occasional 
damage, such as encouraging cooperation and enthusiasm in the culture of the firm, or of 
promoting innovation.  See DAVID HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., ARE OVERCONFIDENT CEO’S 
BETTER INNOVATORS?, April 2010 working paper, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1598021; Eric Van Den Steen, Organizational Beliefs and 
Managerial Vision, 21 J. L., Econ. & Org. 256 (2005).     
 12 
irrelevant old news) on both bidder offers and target responses.28
 
  With 
respect to target psychology, their hypothesis is: 
The most obvious application involves the disposition effect, or the 
reluctance to realize gains relative to the reference point.  While for some 
investors the reference point is likely to be their purchase price, another 
important reference point—and, importantly, one that is common across 
shareholders—is the firm’s 52 week high price. . . . This logic predicts 
that targets are more likely to approve mergers in which the offer price 
approaches or exceeds the 52 week high.  The S-shaped value function, 
on the other hand, predicts that the further is the current price from the 52 
week high, the less influence the marginal dollar has in terms of the 
perception of losses. . . . Anchoring and adjustment may also reinforce 
these predictions at the strategical level of negotiations over price. 
 
With respect to bidders: 
 
The bidder’s psychology can be affected by anchoring and adjustment 
both directly and strategically. . . . The bidder may reason, if the target 
was valued at that level a few months ago, shouldn’t we, with our ability 
to realize synergies, value it above or at least near that same level?  To 
the extent that logic is employed, the 52 week high becomes an anchor, 
and insufficient adjustment from that level becomes the norm. . . . A bit 
more subtly, it suggests that since the bidder’s investors do not think as 
hard as its board about the target’s potential valuation, they are less 
biased by the anchoring phenomenon and so more likely to view 52 week 
high driven bids as overpaying.  Once a valuation is established, the 
bidder must consider the minimum price that the target will accept.  
Bidder boards advised by experienced investment bankers are likely to 
predict that the target’s 52 week high will both be used as a strategic 
anchor against them in negotiations as well as a reference point that their 
own investors truly care about. 
 
After considering a number of possible non-psychological alternative 
hypotheses, they present data showing that the 52 week high exerts a 
strongly disproportionate effect on deal outcomes, which they attribute 
largely to the target’s psychology and the bidder’s anticipation thereof.   
 We could go on at length; there is much more in the behavioral 
corporate finance literature that speaks to M&A activity either directly or 
                                                 
28  MALCOLM BAKER ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRICING IN MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS, NBER working paper, May 23, 2009.  Other work in behavioral finance 
also considers the disproportionate effect of the 52-week high.  See Chuan-Yang Hwang & 
Thomas George, The 52 Week High and Momentum Investing, 59 J. Fin. 2145 (2004). 
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indirectly.  Going back to the hubris hypothesis and the winner’s curse, for 
example, we can also find emotion (affect) based explanations for the 
competitive urge that may produce excessive valuations on the part of 
acquirers, and perhaps reactive devaluation by targets.29  Commitment, 
confirmation and sunk cost biases are also likely to come into play.30  
Group-level biases (risky shift,31
 In addition, there is laboratory evidence to support the intuition that 
cultural conflicts may disable mergers even when they make sense on paper 
by failing to anticipate the learned linguistic and perceptual commonalities 
that help coordinate productive behavior in the constituent firms but clash 
and fail upon consolidation.
 “groupthink”) may as well.  The explosion 
of psychological research on negotiation behavior in the past few decades 
touches in many ways on issues of importance in M&A deal-making.   
32
 But we need not go any more deeply into these because we have 
enough for a prima facie case, at least, that behavioral economics and 
behavioral finance have something potentially interesting to say to M&A 
law.  In other words, I think that the research in this area meets the burden 
of proof on the first three steps of the analysis set forth in Part I.  This work 
takes seriously the need to focus specifically on behavioral traits as they are 
revealed in high level corporate executives, not just the general population.  
It addresses the problem of how such traits might persist—perhaps 
flourish—in corporate settings by generating competitive gains that, on 
average, offset the harms predictably associated with rationally risky 
  Here again, overconfidence and other 
egocentric biases may well lead to a failure of prediction that 
underestimates the difficulty in finding synergies and eliminating 
redundancies when two distinct entities are merged. 
                                                 
29   E.g., Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on 
Motivation and Behavior, 111 Org. Behav. & Human Dec. Processes 139 (2010); Deepak 
Malhotra et al., When Winning is Everything, Harv. Bus. Rev., May 2008, at 78.  There 
may be hormonal influences here, observable in merger-related activity.  See Maurice Levi 
et al., Deal or No Deal? Hormones and the M&A Game, 56 Mgt. Sci. 1462, 1463 
(2010)(finding that younger CEO’s are more dominance-seeking in M&A activity than 
older ones, and attributing this to the influence of testosterone levels). 
30  See Vicki Bogan & David Just, What Drives Merger Decision Making Behavior? Don’t 
Seek, Don’t Find, and Don’t Change Your Mind, 72 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 930 (2009). 
31   See, e.g., Kfir Eliaz et al., Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis, 96 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 1321 (2006).  As the contemporary literature points out, groups can be both 
more risk seeking and more risk averse, depending on context.   
32 See Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer, Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An 
Experimental Approach, 49 Mgt. Sci. 400 (2003).   
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behavior.  And it is sensitive to institutional context, conceding that we 
need evidence of problematic outcomes in the marketplace before the causal 
possibility of heuristics and bias should seriously be considered.  Of 
course—and this is a point at which lawyers and social scientists often have 
difficulty with each other—methodological rigor in research in the social 
sciences cautions against too readily drawing generalizations from data, 
even when the results are statistically significant: there are always 
alternative causal explanations, risks associated with highly controlled 
experimental design, and expressions the need for future research.  Law-
making, on the other hand, cannot wait for scientific certainty and must try 
to draw best-available behavioral inferences from whatever knowledge is at 
hand, even when it is incomplete.  My simple point, then, is that when 
coupled with evidence of poor outcomes for shareholders in many M&A 
transactions, the work on behavioral corporate finance gives us enough 
cause for the law to worry about the psychological risks we have been 
describing, and at least consider whether there are interventions that might 
help. 
  
III.  THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO THE BUY-SIDE PROBLEMS 
 
 We know that many mergers are value destroying, with cyclical 
variations in average frequency.  The research just described offers some 
insight as to why these may occur.  So how should law respond? 
 We should pause here for a predictable interjection from 
conventional financial economics.  As noted, there is also a plausible non-
psychological explanation for value-destroying mergers (an agency cost 
story about empire-building) and so resort to a behavioral account is 
unnecessarily complicating—outcomes are all that really matters.  But for 
legal analysis, this is simply wrong.  Among other things, corporate law 
tends to work with state-of-mind categories like good faith, gross 
negligence, scienter, etc. that are necessarily cognitive in nature.  For 
example, intent or good faith standards might be of use in deterring M&A 
transactions that are deliberately empire-building (the economists’ 
assumption) but not those generated by overconfidence or similar biases 
that operate out of consciousness.  We have to know something about the 
underlying behavior in order to know what categories to use, unless we are 
prepared to rely on strict liability—a strongly disfavored legal standard 
given the close judgments and nuances typically involved in business 
judgments.   
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 Thus we come back to the fourth of the steps described in Part I: the 
normative choice.  Staying focused on the bidder side of the transaction, 
there are a number of possible interventions that could respond to concerns 
about hubris, overconfidence and the winner’s curse: greater shareholder 
say over acquisition transactions, greater independent director control, more 
intense disclosure obligations or more searching judicial review are the four 
most obvious.  Those familiar with corporate law will know that none of 
these is much of a check on value-destruction.  While shareholder voting on 
the acquirer side is sometimes legally necessary, often it is not—and if there 
is no approval requirement, both federal and state law disclosure obligations 
diminish as well.  Board approval is required, but without any special role 
for independent directors (in contrast to conflict of interest transactions, 
discussed infra).  And the business judgment rule puts in place a weak 
rational basis test for judicial review, which can almost always be satisfied 
so long as procedural regularities are followed.   
 Perhaps, then, corporate law is being psychologically naïve in not 
trying to do more.  My sense is probably not, however, and that there is 
more to the disinterest.  After all, there are a fair number of Delaware 
corporate law cases where judges at both the Chancery Court and Supreme 
Court levels have made astute-enough psychological observations to show 
that they are aware of structural biases and egotistical inferences that can 
affect high-stakes transactional judgment.33
 Rather, there are other reasons for what is probably fairly deliberate 
disregard.  One, of course, is that we have to have some confidence in the 
efficacy and cost-effectiveness of the suggested intervention, and these may 
be questionable for other psychological and economic reasons.  For 
instance, the law could insist on greater independent director control over 
acquisitions, on the assumption that they are less likely to exhibit 
overconfidence.  That may be true, but psychology research has offered 
many reasons to be skeptical of director independence as a cure for bias, 
most having to do with the mix of reciprocity demands, low-powered 
incentives and informational deficiencies that can produce excessive 
  
                                                 
33  E.g., In re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003)(discussing many 
motivations in judging others—“Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view 
of human nature that simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated 
notions of the law and economics movement”); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 
297 (Del. Ch. 2000)(questioning possibly unconscious motivations of directors); see also 
note – infra. 
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deference to managerial preference.34  Greater shareholder approval rights 
may make sense, but are very costly and introduce uncertainty into the deal-
making process—and one has to have a strong theory of rational and 
constructive shareholder voting behavior to predict that the benefits will 
outweigh these costs.  Given the rise of institutional investors, who show 
some willingness to counter unwise expansion plans by acquirer 
management when given the opportunity,35
 As to the business judgment rule, deference has many familiar 
justifications even if we accept that psychological biases may exacerbate the 
problem of value-destroying transactions.   The business judgment rule is 
a rule of abstention based, among other things, on the lack of judges’ 
confidence in their own second-guessing skills—perhaps even a sense of 
their own hindsight bias—and how labor and resource-intensive judicial 
review can be if offered generously by the courts.  Going back to the 
discussion in Part I, there is probably some ideological “just deserts” 
reasoning going on, too: shareholders who elected overconfident managers 
have themselves to blame in some abstract sense, and to the extent that 
executive overconfidence on average is a productive bias, shareholders 
should internalize the costs of competitive zeal along with the benefits.    
 this possibility is not out of the 
question.  But neither is it self-evident, and by and large voting rights are a 
legislative rather than judicial issue.     
 In sum, there are significant limits on judges’ ability and willingness 
to incorporate behavioral insights into M&A law, at least on the buy-side.  
So does that render this exercise trivial?  By no means, because corporate 
law is more than just about strategies of judicial or regulatory intervention.  
The practice of corporate law and corporate governance—in which lawyers 
are centrally involved—requires a great deal of psychological as well as 
economic astuteness, and the rich body of behavioral M&A research can 
and should inform how deals are negotiated, structured and approved even 
in setting of minimal judicial review. Well-motivated independent directors 
need, as Malmendier and Tate say, “to play a more active role in project 
assessment and selection to counterbalance CEO overconfidence”36
                                                 
34   E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797 
(2001); but see note --- infra. 
 whether 
35   See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729 (2008). 
36   Malmendier & Tate, supra.  For evidence that a well structured board does in fact 
counter executive-level overconfidence, see ADAM C. KOLASINSKI & XU LI, DO 
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or not the law compels them to, and this research offers a useful assessment 
of psychological risk from which to structure more intelligent questioning 
of managers when they aggressively promote a deal.  It is not simply a 
matter of figuring out whether the managers sincerely believe this deal is in 
the company’s best interest—the test, I suspect, that many naïve directors 
too readily employ, and in which the company’s lawyers too willingly 
acquiesce. 
 
IV.  TURNING TO THE SELL-SIDE: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
 The overconfidence and winner’s choice literature focuses on value-
destroying acquisitions brought on by acquiring company hubris, from 
which target company shareholders (if not the target company as an entity) 
presumably benefit.  However, at least some of the insights can be 
transferred to the sell-side with respect to negotiated acquisitions—e.g., 
managerial overconfidence among potential target companies potentially 
frustrates deals that arguably should be made, and as Baker, Pan and 
Wurgler show in their research, other effects like disposition and anchoring 
and adjustment can work to influence seller behavior.  Negotiated deals that 
do not happen are by and large insulated from judicial review, however, 
which brings us back to many of the same normative “fourth step” issues 
just considered.   
 But judicial review does intensify on the sell-side in a set of M&A 
transactions: defensive responses to hostile takeover bids under Delaware’s 
Unocal and Revlon standards, and the entire fairness inquiry under 
Weinberger and its progeny for conflict of interest transactions.  This is 
much too complicated a body of law to dig into deeply,37
 In these areas, independent director control and/or shareholder 
approval take on much greater significance.  As just noted, there may be 
good psychological justification for this, though that is rarely mentioned 
explicitly in the case law or the academic literature—fear of disloyalty by 
target management in trying to hold onto jobs and the other private benefits 
 but worth a few 
brief observations.   
                                                                                                                            
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS RESTRAIN OVERCONFIDENT CEO’S (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573395.   
37  Many have commented on the tensions and uncertainties in the law.  See, e.g., Ronald 
Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 
491 (2001); William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of 
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. Law. 1287 (2001). 
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of control, and maybe by target directors as well, is the standard explanation 
for the enhanced scrutiny in the takeover context.  In going private 
transactions, the controlling person’s financial interest in freezing out the 
minority shareholders a low price is plain, and the assumption is that it is 
strong enough to overwhelm any inclination of independent directors to do 
right by the minority.   
 With respect to judicial review, the insight that psychology can offer 
has to do with the subtle, largely unconscious process by which people 
rationalize a preferred course of action as the right thing to do.38  Conflicts 
of interest have a strong pull even when the most obvious sources are 
removed—in other words, one can remove directly interested directors or 
shareholders from the deliberative process and still expect a bias in terms of 
transactional outcomes.  Interesting psychological research has shown that 
“gatekeepers”—even statutorily regulated independent auditors—are prone 
to motivated inference when there are strong client or customer preferences 
and some “wiggle room” for coming out the preferred way.39
But here again, the reasons both for and against business judgment 
rule-like abstention are complicated, and courts may well choose to look the 
other way rather than engage in deep inquiries into subjective motivation 
even when they recognize the psychological risk.  The most important 
message of this research is for those trying to manage the deal process in 
shareholders’ best interest, who should recognize the pressures driving 
members of the deal team—not just the most obviously interested parties 
but the lawyers, bankers and accountants as well—and be demanding and 
critical even when persuaded that they genuinely believe in doing the deal. 
  For purposes 
of the standard of review, allowing too much discretion—giving 
independent directors full sway so long as they act in good faith, for 
example, or within some far-ranging zone of reasonableness—probably 
leaves too much room for bias.   
 The same can be said with respect to disclosure of conflicts of 
interest, which may occur (often because legally required) in many different 
contexts.  In a well-known psychology article Cain, Loewenstein and 
Moore offered striking experimental evidence that disclosure of conflicts 
actually both makes opportunism by the discloser more likely (because 
                                                 
38   This is occasionally remarked upon by the courts.  E.g., Paramount Comm. Inc. v QVC 
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)(noting the board’s obsessive focus on completing 
the original deal—“they remained prisoners of their own misconceptions”). 
39  E.g., Max Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, Harv. Bus. Rev., 
Nov. 2002, at 96. 
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disclosure creates greater moral freedom to so behave because the subject 
has been warned) and at the same time makes the subject more willing to 
trust (because the act of disclosing is disarming, at least when it appears to 
be voluntary).40  Subsequent research has questioned the strength of these 
effects, at least where the subject can hold the discloser to account later 
on.41
 Consider, for example, a Second Circuit case, Minzer v. Keegan,
  This remains of interest in the transactional setting, however, because 
of the pervasiveness of disclosure and the variability in the level of 
accountability.   
42
 
 
wherein a controlling entity engineered a freeze out merger at a price 
unpopular with many shareholders, who nonetheless voted to approve the 
transaction, which was at least better than the prevailing distressed market 
price for the minority stock.  The conflicting interest was fully disclosed, 
but the controlling party neglected to reveal a potentially serious inquiry by 
a third party, who was prepared to pay more.  The court held that there was 
no liability even if that was a material omission, because the shareholders 
had no power to compel the majority to consider the alternative bid—hence 
the freeze out price was their only real choice.  In other words, there was no 
causal injury.  Putting aside whether this was the right outcome, one at least 
has to wonder whether the disclosure of the conflict let the controlling 
person feel more freedom to cast fiduciary obligations aside, or whether 
shareholders might have been lulled into thinking that the transaction was 
being handled responsibly, in part, precisely because the adverse interest 
disclosure was so clear. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Research in psychology and behavioral economics sheds interesting, 
sometimes disturbing light on the processes by which M&A transactions 
occur.  Of course there findings are not limited to M&A.  The same 
research programs described earlier—focused on overconfidence, etc.—
have identified other corporate finance contexts in which similar effects are 
                                                 
40  Dylan Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of 
Interest, 34 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (2005). 
41  See Brian Church & Xi Kuang, Conflicts of Interest, Disclosure and (Costly) Sanctions: 
Experimental Evidence, 38 J. Leg. Stud. 505 (2009); see also Christopher Koch & Carsten 
Schmidt, Disclosing Conflicts of Interest—Do Experience and Reputation Matter? 35 
Acct’g, Org. & Soc’y 95 (2010). 
42  218 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000).   
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observed.  Relevant to the recent financial crisis, one can easily see how 
hubris and excessive optimism can lead down the slippery slopes to both 
excessive risk-taking and concealment of those risks from investors, where 
the insiders may, at least for a time, themselves been blinded to reality.43
 As I have emphasized, there are limits on the ability or the 
willingness of courts and regulators to confront the highly contingent, 
situational nature of officer/director inference and decision making.  But we 
can at least hope that they will accept the main insight from the behavioral 
literature, that rationality in corporate judgment cannot be presumed, and 
often fails.  Beyond that, the greatest usefulness of this research is really to 
participants in the transactional process itself, who very much need to 
understand better not only that human nature poses a deal risk, but how, 
why, and under what circumstances there is reason to worry.
  
Categories like bad faith and scienter may be very poor fits for these kinds 
of situations, too.   
44
                                                 
43 See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the 
Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Risk-taking in Financial Services, Cornell L. Rev. 
(forthcoming, 2011); Malcolm Gladwell, Cocksure: Banks, Battles and the Psychology of 
Overconfidence, New Yorker, July 27, 2009, at 24. 
 
44   An excellent resource is PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM 
SOLVING, DECISION MAKING AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND 
POLICYMAKERS (2010). 
